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ESSAY
IS TITLE VII EFFICIENT?
JOHN J. DONOHUE IIIt
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' is widely regarded as
one of the most important pieces of legislation enacted in this century.
Whether one views the Act merely as the confirmation of larger events
already well underway2 or as the pivotal event leading to substantial
economic progress for blacks3 and other minorities, it stands as the most
visible legislative pronouncement of this country's commitment to equal
opportunity for all Americans.
Despite its undoubtedly heroic ambitions and unrivaled legislative
prominence, however, the Act is not without its critics. In fact, some
view it as the most conspicuous example of a legislative effort to shape
private preferences-an endeavor that is thought to be "at best mis-
guided and more likely tyrannical." 4 The neoclassical economic model,
which rests so heavily on the desirability of aggregating private prefer-
ences expressed in the marketplace, has long provided the theoretical
foundation for the argument against this antidiscrimination legislation.5
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I Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e)(17)
(1982).
2 See Smith, Race and Human Capital, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 685, 686 (1984)
(suggesting that the rise in relative black income throughout this century has been an
evolutionary process resulting from the narrowing of the human capital disparities be-
tween the races).
S See Freeman, Black Economic Progress After 1964: Who Has Gained and
Why?, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 247, 269 (S. Rosen ed. 1981).
4 Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. -,
-(1986).
5 See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108-15 (1962); R. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 615-25 (3d ed. 1986); Landes, The Economics of
Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 507, 548 (1968).
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Indeed, coupled with the normative principle of wealth maximization,
the neoclassical economic model might appear to serve as the basis for
unrelenting opposition to any form of government interference in free
market outcomes. But, as is now well recognized, legal intervention can
also serve to facilitate or enhance the operation of the market, thereby
furthering the objective of wealth maximization.'
If one looks beyond the traditional static analysis of Title VII and
instead evaluates the law in a dynamic context, one finds that the logic
of the attack on Title VII is incomplete. As this paper shows, legisla-
tion that prohibits employer discrimination may actually enhance
rather than impair economic efficiency. Part I of this essay discusses the
basic neoclassical economic model of labor markets, Part II examines
Gary S. Becker's pioneering analysis of employment discrimination,7
and Part III summarizes the traditional theoretical argument against
Title VII. Part IV then explores the dynamic consequences of this an-
tidiscrimination legislation and demonstrates the invalidity of the con-
clusion that such legislation necessarily reduces social welfare. Part V
offers concluding remarks.
I. THE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL OF THE LABOR MARKET
Consider the market for labor in a nondiscriminatory world. For a
given capital stock, firms have a downward sloping demand for labor-
ers, while the supply curve for laborers slopes upward.' The intersec-
tion of these two curves, as shown in figure 1, determines the equilib-
rium wage (the vertical axis) and quantity of labor hired (the
horizontal axis).
For those unfamiliar with demand and supply curves, it may be
helpful to discuss how they are derived and what they represent. The
demand curve for labor is preaicated on the assumption that capital is
fixed in the short run. The first worker hired by a firm will then have
a certain capital stock at her disposal, which is used to generate a cer-
tain physical product. The value to the employer of the worker's prod-
uct is represented by the vertical distance from the horizontal axis up to
I The overarching theme of Posner's Economic Analysis of Law is that only one
type of intervention tends to enhance welfare: "[J]udge-made rules tend to be effi-
ciency-promoting while those made by legislatures tend to be efficiency-reducing." R.
POSNER, supra note 5, at 495 (footnotes omitted). See generally R. POSNER, supra note
5.
7 See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DIscRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
' The demand and supply curves are drawn throughout this paper as straight
lines for computational ease.
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Figure 1
The Short-Run Supply and Demand for Labor
$
Equilibrium
Wage
the firm's demand curve and will depend on both the' amount of the
particular product produced and the price at which the product sells.
One can therefore think of the vertical distance to the demand curve as
representing the marginal benefit associated with hiring an additional
worker.
Labor
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Of course, to obtain this benefit the employer must incur the ex-
pense of hiring that worker. The wage that must be paid to hire an
additional worker is given by the vertical distance to. the supply curve.
The supply curve, therefore, represents the cost to society of employing
one extra worker. Put differently, it represents the worker's monetary
valuation of the cost of working. 9
Accordingly, so long as the demand curve lies above the supply
curve, society will gain by employing an additional worker. This is be-
cause the benefit to the employer of the value of the worker's produc-
tion is greater than the cost to the worker of working-obviously a
mutually beneficial transaction. It is important to recognize a central
tenet of the neoclassical economic model: in a" world without externali-
ties, ° market-determined private costs and benefits will equal social
costs and benefits. It is this assumption that allows one to conclude
that, if the private benefit to the employer of receiving the worker's
output exceeds the worker's private cost of toiling, social welfare is
increased by hiring the worker."1
Once the first worker has been hired, the question becomes
whether society would benefit by the hiring of a second worker. Again
the supply and demand curves provide the answer. Note that in figure
1 the vertical distance to the demand curve associated with hiring the
second worker is less than the vertical distance associated with hiring
the first worker, a result that follows from the law of diminishing re-
turns.12 Moreover, if more workers must be hired, one would expect
9 If the individual refuses to work unless her wage is at least $4.00 per hour, then
$4.00 represents the individual's private cost of Working (or reservation wage). Since
the neoclassical model translates private costs into social costs, $4.00 also represents the
cost to society of having this individual employed. For a clear discussion of the basics of
labor supply, aemand, and mobility, see R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 333-51
(6th ed. 1981).
10 Externalities are said to
arise when the voluntary economic activities of economic agents-in pro-
duction, consumption, or exchange-affect the interests of other economic
agents in a way not setting up legally recognized rights of compensation or
redress ....
Externalities, therefore, represent sources of social gain or loss that
do not get translated into the [private] market signals that constitute the
Invisible Hand.
J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 449 (1976).
" For present purposes all of the assumptions of the neoclassical economic model
are accepted. For those interested in a more critical assessment of these assumptions,
see Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 34-
37 (1975); Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 509 (1980).
12 The law of diminishing returns applies in this case because, by assumption,
there is a fixed supply of capital and an increase in the quantity of labor working with
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the wage offered to rise because more workers must be lured away
from alternative opportunities.13 As the wage offered rises, more work-
ers will be ready to accept this employment, which generates an up-
ward-sloping supply curve. The demand curve still lies above the sup-
ply curve in figure 1 when two workers are hired; thus, social welfare
would be increased by putting the second individual to work.
This process can be repeated until the intersection of the supply
and demand curves at E1 is reached-the point of maximum social wel-
fare. If fewer than Q workers are hired, the demand curve lies above
the supply curve, which indicates that the benefits of additional hiring
are greater than the accompanying social costs. On the other hand, if
more than Q, workers are hired, the costs will exceed the benefits and
social welfare would be reduced. Because El represents the point of
maximum social welfare it is, by definition, the economically efficient
outcome.
II. INTRODUCING DISCRIMINATION
Thus far, it has been assumed that no discrimination exists in the
labor market. Gary S. Becker's pioneering work, however, has shown
that the neoclassical model can readily be extended to analyze labor
market discrimination. 4 Following Becker, discrimination is now intro-
duced in the form of an aversion by employers to certain groups even
though all groups of workers are equally productive. 5
If, for example, employers have an aversion to black workers, the
consequence of this discrimination is, in effect, to shift the supply curve
for black labor from S1 up to S2, as shown in figure 2.16
this capital. Because the amount of capital per worker has declined, one would expect
the marginal product to decline as well. For a detailed explanation of the law of dimin-
ishing returns, see R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 9, at 190-92.
'" The statement in the text refers to the total supply of labor. This should be
distinguished from the supply of labor available to a single firm in a competitive econ-
omy, because the firm would be so small relative to the entire labor market that it could
hire as much labor as it wished at the equilibrium wage.
14 See G. BECKER, supra note 7, at 6.
15 Although Becker considers other models of discrimination-such as discrimina-
tion on the part of white employees and customers-he begins his book with the model
of employer discrimination, see G. BECKER, supra note 7, at 14-18, 39-54. Friedman
and Posner afford similar prominence to this model of discrimination. See supra note 5.
" Intuitively, employer discrimination against blacks reduces the demand for
black labor. The supply curve in figure 2 is shown shifting upward rather than the
demand curve shifting downward, however, simply for heuristic convenience, as both
1986]
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Figure 2
The Short-Run Supply and Demand for Black Labor
Given Employer Discrimination
A 2
ES2
B S,
L
W2 C
D
Q2 QQuantity of
Black Labor
This upward parallel shift in the supply curve due to employer distaste
approaches are identical. To see this, note that in figure 2a, S1 and D, are the relevant
supply and demand curves in a nondiscriminatory market.
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for black workers is exactly analogous to a tax of amount E2C on each
black worker hired.1" The benefits derived from hiring additional black
Figure 2a
The Short-Run Supply and Demand for Black Labor
Given Employer Discrimination:
Shifting the Supply Curve Up or Shifting the Demand Curve Down
S,
d.
X
C
01Q Q Quantity of
Black Labor
These curves intersect at the market equilibrium E1 and establish a market wage of W,
for Q, black workers. When discrimination is introduced, the demand for black labor
drops by d, and a new demand curve D2 is established, where D, = % - d. S1 and
D, intersect at C and establish a new market equilibrium wage of W, for Q, black
workers. If, instead of shifting the demand curve down by d the supply curve is shifted
up by d, the new supply curve is S,, where S. = S, + d. S, intersects D, at E,. The
resulting wage is again W, (because the difference between B and W 2 is d, the psychic
cost of discrimination) for Q black workers. It is thus mathematically irrelevant, as far
as the determination for W and Q are concerned, whether the demand curve shifts
down (at C, S, = D, - d) or the supply curve shifts up (at C, D, = S, + d).
1" To perfect the analogy, one would have to assume that the tax revenues col-
lected are thrown away or wasted.
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workers are still given by the same demand curve, but now there is a
cost associated with hiring black workers in addition to the previously
specified monetary cost embodied in the wage. Thus, to hire the first
worker, a discriminatory employer must pay not only the monetary
wage but also a psychic or nonmonetary cost associated with hiring a
worker for whom she has personal distaste. The analysis then proceeds
exactly as before. Employers will evaluate the benefits of increased pro-
duction from hiring black workers and will offset them against the total
costs, both monetary and nonmonetary, of hiring these workers.
The effect will be to reduce the number of blacks hired from the
previous level Q, to a lower level O%. At the same time, the wage of
black workers will fall from the previous level W1 to a lower level W2.
The model therefore generates two plausible predictions: (1) discrimi-
nation leads to a reduction in the hiring of black labor, and (2) discrim-
ination causes a decrease in black wages.
The effect of discrimination on the welfare of employers is an im-
portant and controversial issue. With capital fixed in the short run,
employers are interested in maximizing "profits," which are deter-
mined by subtracting the total labor cost from the total value of produc-
tion. In the nondiscriminatory case, profits were given by the area of
the triangle W1AE, in figure 2. The total value of production is the
area under the demand curve from zero to Q, workers, or area
OAE 1Q. Employers, however, have paid a wage of W, to their Q,
workers, an amount represented by the area 0WE 1Q,. The difference
between what is produced and the cost of production 8 represents short-
run profits, WjAE 1.19
The introduction of discrimination changes the wage and hiring
levels for black workers. Because the number of black workers has de-
clined to Q, total production now falls to OAE 2Q and the total wage
cost falls to OW2CO . But, in addition to the monetary cost imposed by
the wage bill, discriminatory employers will also have to bear a non-
monetary cost associated with the hiring of black laborers-a type of
"discrimination" tax-given by the area W2BE 2C. As a result, the net
profits earned by discriminatory employers fall to the amount repre-
sented by the area of the triangle BAE2 .20 The triangle BAE 2 necessa-
's 0AEQ - OWEQ = WAE,
19 To be more precise, W,AE represents the return on the employers' capital. If
this return is less than a normal rate of return, then negative profits are being earned
although W,AE, represents a positive area. Only that portion of the return in excess of
a normal rate of return is deemed true economic profit.
20 Net profits for the discriminator equal the value of total production less the cost
of wages less the "discrimination tax," i.e., BAE2 -= OAE 2Q2 - OWICQ2 -
W2BEC.
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rily encompasses a lesser area than the triangle W1AE,. Therefore, not
only does the black labor force suffer but discriminatory employers are
also harmed by the discrimination.
Interestingly, in this partial equilibrium analysis of the black labor
market, figure 2 depicts a situation in which the monetary profits of the
discriminatory employers have risen. The reason for this increase in
monetary profits is that the reduction in the hiring of black labor has
driven the black wage down to such a degree that monetary profits to
the discriminators, represented by W2AE2O, 21 are greater than the
profits of the nondiscriminatory firms, represented by W1AEr.2" Conse-
quently, the uniform pattern of discrimination has caused employers to
make more money but to be less profitable in an economic sense.2"
The implication that employers may earn more money but be less
profitable is not as perplexing as it might first appear. This phenome-
non occurs in many contexts throughout the economy, because, quite
simply, money is not the only thing that people value. For example,
consider a professor who applies for a position at Elite University that
pays a salary of $30,000 and for a similar position at Podunk Univer-
sity, which offers $40,000. If the professor would prefer to work at
Elite in spite of its lower salary, this can be restated in economic terms
21 Monetary profits for the discriminator equal the value of total production less
the cost of wages, i.e., W2AE 2C = OAE 2Q, - OW2CQ.
22 This is true because W2WXC is greater than XE2EI. In figure 2, W2W1XC is
approximately 1.5 as large as XE2E,. This relationship is not invariable, however. See
infra note 23.
22 In this partial equilibrium analysis, the effect of discrimination on the monetary
profits of discriminators in general will depend on the supply and demand elasticities
underlying the curves in figure 2. The elasticity of demand for labor, for example, is
the percentage decrease in the quantity of labor demanded resulting from a 1% increase
in the wage. Given different elasticities from those depicted in figure 2, it would be
possible for discrimination to decrease monetary profits. This would occur if W2WXC
were less than XE2E,.
Determining the effect of discrimination on monetary profits becomes considerably
more complicated if one allows the effects of discrimination against blacks to affect the
equilibrium in the labor market for whites. In this event, the employers' monetary gain
from the depressed black wage may be outweighed by the concomitant increase in the
white wage rate. Nonetheless, the basic argument of this paper concerning the effi-
ciency of Title VII is not affected by this point.
The issue of the effect of discrimination on monetary profits is, however, critical in
other settings. For example, Michael Reich examined income data for whites in an
attempt to disprove Becker's theory that discrimination hurts discriminators. See Reich,
The Economics of Racism, in PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 183 (D. Gordon ed.
1977). Reich concludes that white capitalists do better where discrimination is greater,
see id. at 188. Reich's findings, how~ver, rest on monetary income data, and, as figure
2 shows, it is possible that discriminators are worse off in terms of net welfare (sub-
tracting out the psychic cost of discrimination) but richer as a result of pervasive dis-
crimination against blacks. In that event, Reich's findings, properly interpreted, would
not be inconsistent with Becker's model.
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to say that the difference in prestige is worth more than $10,000 to the
professor. If she receives an offer only from Podunk, she will earn more
money, but will be less satisfied and less well off in economic terms.
Just as the prestige-conscious professor has an incentive not to go to
Podunk, the discriminatory employers in the Becker model have an in-
centive not to hire blacks and thereby bear the associated psychic costs.
Therefore, Becker's point is that, even though employers may earn
more money because of their discriminatory practices, it is not economic
self-interest that prompts employer discrimination.
Consider what would happen if discriminatory employers did not
really dislike blacks but merely acted as if they did in the hopes of
raising their monetary incomes. At first glance, it would appear that
such employers could end up at point E2 in figure 2, earning higher
monetary profits without suffering any discriminatory cost. But while
nondiscriminatory employers would have an economic incentive to re-
strict the hiring of black workers to arrive at point E2, they would have
no power to do so in a competitive market. 4 Indeed, employers could
only arrive at the E, outcome if they could collude or gain the backing
of government. Thus, in this model, it is the government-which may
resort to pernicious legislation such as the apartheid laws in South Af-
rica-not the free market, that stands as the potential enemy of the
victims of discriminatory conduct.
III. THE IMPACT OF TITLE VII
Although no one disputes that an unwise or pernicious government
can produce socially harmful consequences through interference in la-
bor markets, a more interesting question is whether the government can
play a positive role as well. Landes alludes to the traditional view that
if one's objective is wealth maximization then the passage of antidis-
crimination legislation can only be harmful: "[If the benefits [of such
legislation] are viewed as the added net (monetary plus psyche) income
to the community, then the benefits would be negative, because net in-
come is maximized in the absence of fair employment laws."'25
The rationale for this contention can be readily illustrated by ref-
erence to figure 2. Suppose that, by enacting Title VII, the government
succeeds in restoring the nondiscriminatory equilibrium E1. Short-run
2 In a competitive market, employers would be tempted to offer a wage slightly
above the prevailing wage W2 in order to attract more workers, because at E2 the
demand curve (marginal benefit) is considerably higher than the supply curve (margi-
nal cost). The upward pressure on wages would only stop when the equilibrium point
E, was reached.
" Landes, supra note 5, at 548.
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social welfare would fall according to this model because the hiring of
any workers beyond the Q2 level would impose greater social costs
(represented by the S2 supply curve) than social benefits (represented
by the D demand curve). 26 The location of E2 represents the point of
wealth maximization, and any attempt to move to El will simply lower
total social welfare.27 Consequently, if one accepts both the Becker
model of employer discrimination and the goal of wealth maximiza-
tion,28 then the short-run effect of introducing Title VII into a discrim-
inatory environment is clear: to the extent that Title VII has any effect
on the labor market, it will be socially harmful. 9
Opponents of antidiscrimination legislation urge that government
action is not necessary because, in the long run, the operation of the
competitive market will return the equilibrium level to E. The basic
26 This discussion abstracts from a number of real world complications. First, the
costs of enforcing the antidiscrimination legislation are ignored. Second, the assumption
that legislation can move the labor market precisely to the unknown equilibrium that
would occur if no discrimination existed is obviously chimerical. Nevertheless, because
this would be the result if employers obeyed the law by hiring workers without regard
to race, it is a useful assumption in order to analyze the effect of Title VII if its goal
were realized. Of course, the effort to discern the nondiscriminatory equilibrium is im-
mensely more complicated in the real world where labor is far from homogeneous and
where differences in wage rates reflect not only labor market discrimination but also
differences in productivity and occupational choice as well.
17 According to this neoclassical analysis, although the imposition of Title VII
lowers short-run social welfare, it increases the welfare of blacks as well. Blacks are
better off at E, because the black employment level and wage rate are both higher.
Nevertheless, the gain to blacks is economically outweighed by the loss to white em-
ployers and social welfare is reduced accordingly.
28 Once again, determining the wealth that is maximized at point E, requires a
consideration of both monetary and nonmonetary forms of wealth. Thus, if an em-
ployer would gain $5.00 by hiring a black worker, but would be equally happy hiring
a less productive white worker who would provide a benefit of $3.00, the "wealth"
obtained by hiring the black worker is only $3.00. The remaining $2.00 represents the
psychic cost of hiring a black.
In Posner's system of wealth maximization, wealth is
measured by what people are willing to pay for something or, if they al-
ready own it, what they demand in money to give it up. The only kind of
preference that counts . . . is thus one.that is backed up by money-in
other words, that is registered in a market.
Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, an," Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119
(1979). Thus private costs and benefits are deemed equivalent to social costs and
benefits.
" This point is axiomatic: because E. is defined as the point of wealth maximiza-
tion, any departure from E2 must reduce social welfare and is therefore harmful. One
could imagine, however, that the enactment of Title VII might alter preferences,
thereby changing the configuration of the supply and demand curves. In that event, the
intersection of these curves no longer would be at point E2, and the point of wealth
maximization would change. For instance, if legally enforced integration ultimately
caused a reduction in discriminatory attitudes, then the enactment of Title VII might
enhance long-run social welfare.
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argument is that discriminatory firms are not maximizing profits and
therefore eventually will be driven out of the market.30 The short-run
analysis had assumed that the level of capital was fixed. In the long
run, however, capital will flow to more profitable enterprises, and any
employer that has shunned discrimination will earn higher profits.
Such a firm would be willing to hire more black workers at the de-
pressed market wage of W2 (in figure 2) and would be able to expand
production and profits beyond the levels of its competitors. As long as
there is a single nondiscriminatory employer, all discriminators will be
driven out of the market. 1 Therefore, in the long run the nondiscrimi-
o See Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR
MARKETS 3, 10 (Ashenfelter & Rees eds. 1973); Marshall, The Economics of Racial
Discrimination: A Survey, 12 J. ECON. LITERATURE 852 (1974).
" See supra note 30. A number of points should be made concerning the predic-
tion that discriminators will be driven from the market. First, a single nondiscriminat-
ing firm will be able to drive out all of the discriminatory firms, given constant returns
to scale technology. Constant returns to scale technology implies that the firm can ex-
pand as much as it wants without suffering from increasing average costs. If average
costs rise with increased production, however, more nondiscriminatory firms might be
needed to drive out discriminators.
Second, Arrow, while acknowledging that Becker's model predicts the elimination
of discrimination, concludes that because discrimination has persisted for decades,
Becker's model "must have some limitation." Arrow, supra note 30, at 10. Becker
might respond that the persistence of discrimination is probably caused by the obstruc-
tions to the free market-government, unions, monopolies-and that where the free
market exists the model is correct. For an interesting, but ultimately unsatisfactory,
attempt to resolve these issues, see Goldberg, Discrimination, Nepotism, and Long-
Run Wage Differentials, 97 Q.J. EON. 307 (1982). Goldberg's model demonstrates
that discrimination can persist in the market if it is motivated not by animus against
blacks but by favoritism towards whites. This demonstration is undermined, however,
by the arbitrary and unrealistic nature of Goldberg's basic assumption that favoritism,
rather than animus, is the source of labor market discrimination. See id. at 314-18.
Third, Nelson and Winter have argued with some force that non-profit-maximiz-
ers will not necessarily be driven from the market-a position of such extravagant het-
erodoxy that it has been largely ignored by those steeped in the neoclassical tradition.
See R. NELSON & S. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE
139-54 (1982).
Fourth, even if in general, non-profit-maximizers would be driven from the mar-
ket, it does not follow necessarily that the discriminators discussed in figure 2 will be
driven out because they are making greater monetary profits than they were in the
nondiscriminatory state. Becker might respond with the following example. A discrimi-
natory employer earns a monetary return of 12% on her capital from hiring black
workers, but she feels only as well off from this enterprise as she would with an 8%
return because of the psychic cost of discrimination. If this employer could invest her
capital in a money market fund, earning for example 10%, she would give up her
business and earn 10%. The discriminatory employer would try to sell her business to
the highest bidder. Although she would not care whether the buyer possessed discrimi-
natory attitudes, the purchaser who is willing to pay the highest price will tend to be a
nondiscriminator. This follows from the fact that a discriminator would view the busi-
ness as an asset that yields an 8% annual return, whereas a nondiscriminator would
view it as an asset that yields a 12% annual return. As a result, Becker's prediction that
discriminators would be driven from the market would be effectuated. See G. BECKER,
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natory equilibrium E1 will be restored.
The traditional view thus can be summarized as follows: in the
short run, antidiscrimination legislation is harmful because it will re-
duce total social welfare; in the long run, it is unnecessary because the
market will restore the nondiscriminatory equilibrium by disciplining
discriminators. Within the framework of the neoclassical economic
model, this argument has a certain elegance and logical appeal. None-
theless, it is incorrect. A more discerning dynamic analysis reveals that
there is no a priori basis for assuming that Title VII reduces total so-
cial welfare.
IV. A DYNAMICIANALYSIS OF TITLE VII
The previous discussion has provided only a static analysis of Title
VII. This analysis demonstrated that the total social welfare associated
with the nondiscriminatory equilibrium (labeled SW 1) is necessarily
greater than net social welfare associated with the short-run discrimi-
natory equilibrium (labeled SW 2). 2 It will now be useful to consider
explicitly how net social welfare will change over time both with and
without antidiscrimination legislation.
First consider the case in which Title VII does not exist. Figure 3
depicts the changing level of net social welfare, beginning at time 0,
with SW 2 representing the initial short-run net social welfare associ-
ated with the discriminatory equilibrium E2. As time passes, more and
more discriminatory employers will be driven from the market by non-
discriminatory employers, thereby increasing social welfare."3 Ulti-
mately, when all the discriminatory firms have been driven out, net
social welfare will rise to the level of SW 1 associated with equilibrium
El-where it presumably will remain. The time path of social welfare
in the laissez-faire state begins at SW2 and rises to SW, at time 2t, as
supra note 7, at 39-47.
32 Total social welfare in the nondiscriminatory case is given by the area between
the supply and demand curves. This area has two parts: employer profits, WXAE 1, and
labor's inframarginal rent, JWE,. Inframarginal rent is the amount of wages paid to
labor above that necessary to induce workers to work. Such rents exist whenever the
supply curve for labor is upward sloping and all workers receive the same (equilib-
rium) wage.
Similarly, one can obtain the total short-run social welfare in the discriminatory
case by using the shifted-up supply curve (S,) instead of the original supply curve (Si).
The area so obtained will be equal to the net profits of the discriminatory employers,
BAE2 , plus the inframarginal rents earned by black labor, JW 2C.
33 Social welfare increases when a discriminatory employer of black labor is re-
placed by a nondiscriminatory employer because the psychic cost of discrimination is
eliminated.
1986]
1424 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Figure 3
The Time Path of Social Welfare With and Without Title VII
Net
Social
Welfare
SW"
SW 2
SW,
with
Title VII
without
Title VII
Time
shown in figure 3."*
The dynamic pattern of net social welfare would look different if
Title VII were adopted at time 0. Initially, as discussed in Part III, net
social welfare would be reduced by virtue of the imposition of Title
VII. Thus, at time 0, total net social welfare associated with Title VII
(labeled SW,) would be less than the unrestrained market outcome
(i.e., SW, < SW 2).
To dissect the impact of Title VII, however, its effects on the prof-
" Merely for heuristic convenience, the time path of social welfare has been illus-
trated as linear. In the context of this model, the linear time path implies that the
number of identical firms driven from the market (N) is a proportional function of time
(T). That is N = cT, where c is a constant. Accordingly, the time T* at which social
welfare reaches SW, occurs when all N* discriminators have been driven out at T* =
N*/c. In other words, if c discriminatory firms are driven from the market during each
time period, then all N* discriminatory firms would be driven out after N*/c periods.
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its of employers as well as on the earnings of black labor must be ex-
amined. Figure 4 replicates figure 2 in showing the supply and demand
curve for black labor. Once again, the shifted-up supply curve S. re-
flects the total-monetary and psychic-cost of hiring black workers
when employers are prejudiced against blacks.
Figure 4
The Short-Run Supply and Demand for Black Labor
Given Employer Discrimination: Effect of Title VII
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Figure 4 can be used to illustrate that discriminatory firms necessarily
will earn lower net profits under Title VII than they would earn with-
out this legal constraint. Imposition of Title VII requires employers to
hire Q, units of black labor at the nondiscriminatory wage W1. The
total cost associated with hiring a black worker under the legal con-
straint of Title VII is OF = OW1 + W1F, wherein the first term
(OW1) represents the wage cost and the second term (WF) represents
the psychic cost of discrimination. Therefore, the total value of produc-
tion is given by OAE 1Qj and the total cost is given by OFHQ,. 5 As a
result, the net profit to the discriminator under the Title VII regime is
FAG - GHE1 , which is less than the profit of BAE 2, which is gener-
ated in the absence of a legal requirement of nondiscriminatory
behavior."'
The fact that Title VII causes a reduction in the profits of dis-
criminators has an important implication for the time path of net social
welfare: one can assume that discriminators will be driven from the
market more rapidly with Title VII than without it. In the long run,
the Becker model predicts that discriminators will be driven from the
market, thereby elevating net social welfare to the level SW 1 shown in
figure 3. But the stochastic nature of the economic environment sug-
gests that for some discriminators the long run will be reached more
quickly than it will be for others. Some firms will soon realize that they
will be unable to compete and therefore will exit more rapidly, whereas
" The total cost of production equals the total cost of hiring each black worker
times the number of black workers hired, i.e., OFHQ = OF X 0Q4 . Once again, the
fixed capital costs are ignored.
" The net profits of discriminatory employers (monetary and nonmonetary) will
be greater without Title VII (BAE 2) than with it (FAG - GHE,) because BAE 2 is
greater than FAG and thus BAE2 is greater than FAG - GHE. This is plausible
because Title VII imposes a constraint on the behavior of employers. Because they can
achieve any outcome without the constraint that is available with the constraint, one
would expect employers to do at least as well or better without the Title VII constraint.
If the legal constraint did not attempt to impose the nondiscriminatory equilibrium
E,, as Title VII does, but instead only required employees to pay blacks and whites
equal wages W,, then employers would stop hiring blacks at the point on the horizon-
tal axis directly below point G and employer profits would equal FAG. Note that this
would reduce the number of blacks hired below the level Q, in the laissez-faire dis-
criminatory state. Moreover, because the black wage would be W, and at this wage Q,
blacks would be willing to work, the equal pay requirement would generate involun-
tary unemployment. Since black unemployment rates became much larger than white
unemployment rates in the last two decades, it is possible that employers have re-
sponded to Title VII at least in part as if it were an equal wage act. Certainly, in the
absence of legal penalties, they would have a monetary incentive to do this because
profits with an equal wage act (FAG) are considerably greater than profits under Title
VII (FAG - GHE). This pattern of partial compliance with Title VII may reflect
the greater ease of proving wage discrimination rather than a discriminatory refusal to
hire.
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others will try to ward off the inevitable and succumb more slowly to
the ineluctable market forces.
Accordingly, the rate of exit r can be viewed as a stochastic process
that is a function of the profit level of the discriminatory firms:
thus r i = k (ir* - 7ri) where
k = a positive constant;
ir* = a normal rate of return
and
7ri = the net profit level of the discriminatory firm in
state i;
where
i = 1 represents the laissez-faire state;
i = 2 represents the Title VII state.
Since 7r is greater than 1r,, it follows that r, is less than r2. That is,
because profits for discriminating firms are lower with Title VII, these
firms will exit from the market more quickly with Title VII than with-
out it.
37
Consequently, the return to the point of highest social welfare
where all discriminators have been driven from the market (SW 1)
would be far more rapid with the antidiscrimination legislation than in
the free market scenario, as shown in figure 3. Thus, while Title VII
imposes a short-run cost in net social welfare (i.e., SWa < SW 2), it
will drive out discriminators more rapidly, thereby elevating net social
welfare to the higher level (SW 1) more rapidly. So long as area b is
greater than area a in figure 3, net social welfare would be enhanced
by the imposition of Title VII."
Various factois will determine the relative sizes of triangles a and
b. The smaller the initial net social welfare loss associated with Title
VII (SW 2 - SW.) and the faster Title VII accelerates the exit of the
discriminators (the more r2 exceeds r,), then the larger area b will tend
to be relative to area a. The size of SW 2 - SW,, which will always be
positive, will depend upon how much Title VII helps blacks and in-
jures discriminatory employers.39 The size of r2 - r,, which will al-
37 If profits are normal in the nondiscriminatory state then fl*i = 77* and the
rate of firm exit is zero. On the other hand, if profits are above normal- n'*i >n *-then the industry will attract entrants, as shown by the negative exit rate.
" This statement implicitly assumes a zero rate of discount. If the discount rate
were positive, area b would have to exceed area a to make Title VII welfare-enhancing
because the future benefits would be weighted less heavily than the current costs.
" The analysis thus far has assumed that changes in the demand for black work-
ers induced by discrimination or by the passage of Title VII will have only limited
impact on the demand for white workers. A more complete analysis should consider the
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ways be positive, depends only upon how much Title VII injures dis-
criminatory employers (on 1, - 7r,). These injuries to discriminatory
employers will drive them out of business. At the same time, such inju-
ries also yield a lower SWs. But note that there is an important offset-
ting factor at work: although Title VII harms white employers it aids
black workers. Thus, SW 2 - SWa (the reduction in total social welfare
caused by Title VII at time 0) is less than 7r, - 72 (the reduction in
profits of discriminatory employers). The cost imposed by Title VII,
therefore, is properly focused to achieve greater dynamic efficiency; the
greater the burden on discriminatory employers, the faster welfare rises
to the optimal level SW1 .
40
Table 1 clarifies these points.
Table 1
A Comparison of Three States at Time 0 Based on Figure 4
Discrimination Discrimination
No Discrimination (Laissez-Faire) (with Title VII)
Net Social JAE,* BAE, + JWC** FAG - GHE + JWE,
Welfare
Employer Net WAE,* BAE,** FAG - GHE,
Profits
Employer Monetary WAE, WSAEIC* WAE,
Profits
Total Black JWE,* JW'C JWiE,*
Earnings
Psychic Cost of None* W2BEC** WFHE,
Discrimination
Loss in Net Social - WBE2E C* WFHE, = WIBIK
Welfare Compared
to Nondiscrimination
State
* identifies the state in which the particular characteristic achieves its best (or least bad) value.
For example, net social welfare is highest in the nondiscrimination state.
** identifies the second best value.
Total social welfare associated with equilibrium E1 (the nondiscrimina-
tion state) is given by the area JAEt-that is, the area below the de-
effects of these factors on the market for white workers as well as on the market for
black workers. In such a case, the passage of Title VII would help blacks but harm
white workers and discriminatory employers. The omission of the effects on the white
labor market has considerably reduced the complexity of the presentation without alter-
ing the thrust of the argument.
40 In the limiting case, where the imposition of Title VII imposed such hardship
on discriminatory employers that they immediately left the market by selling their busi-
nesses to nondiscriminatory employers, area a would be eliminated and Title VII
would enhance welfare unambiguously.
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mand curve but above the relevant supply curve. The introduction of
discrimination into this nondiscriminatory world reduces total net
short-run social welfare to a smaller amount, BAE2 + JW 2 C, with the
remaining area W2BE 2E1C representing two forms of loss: (1) the loss
of the production surplus CE 2E1 that is not generated because only %.
black workers are hired, and (2) the discriminatory cost W2BE2C,
which represents the loss associated with hiring the %. blacks. The
imposition of Title VII shifts the burden of the social cost of discrimi-
nation and increases its size from W2BE2E1C to W2 BIK.41 While the
imposition of Title VII decreases social welfare by an area equal to
CE2E1 , the amount of the loss borne by discriminating firms is greater
than CE2Ei. This follows because the full weight of the discriminatory
burden, which had previously been shared by both discriminators and
victims alike, now is shifted totally onto the discriminators."2
Burdening discriminatory employers not only promotes arguably
normative goals but also has the competitive benefit of more quickly
driving discriminators out of the market. In summary, the smaller the
sacrifice in initial social welfare (SW 2 - SW.) and the greater the
burden on the discriminator ( 7ri - 7r2) (and therefore the greater the
speed with which the discriminators are driven out and social welfare
rises to SW,), then the greater the likelihood that Title VII will be
welfare maximizing. Both considerations, then, suggest that area b may
well be greater than area a-that social welfare will be enhanced by
the imposition of Title VII.
The following example illustrates the factors that influence the dy-
"I The loss in net social welfare at time 0 associated with the enactment of Title
VII, compared to the nondiscrimination state, is computed in the following manner. In
the nondiscrimination state, net social welfare equals JAE1 (JAE, = WAE, +
JWE, ), which is the sum of employer net profits and total black earnings. Because
total black earnings are the same in the nondiscrimination and the Title VII states, we
need only to focus on the effect of Title VII on employer net profits, which is given by
monetary profits W1AE minus psychic costs WFHE1. Thus, the reduction in total
social welfare at time 0 from Title VII vis-a-vis the nondiscrimination state equals
WFHE,, which in turn equals W2BEEC (the loss in the discriminatory laissez-faire
state) plus (E2IE1 + CEIK). The area of the two triangles in brackets equals CE2E,
which establishes that the total cost at time 0 of introducing Title VII into a discrimi-
natory market is CE2 E,.
"' The preceding footnote indicated that: (1) the reduction in short-run social wel-
fare resulting from the introduction of discrimination into a nondiscriminatory market
for black labor equals area W5BE2E1C; and (2) the additional loss in welfare from
introducing Title VII into this discriminatory world' is given by area CE2 E,. Mathe-
matically, these two statements can be expressed as follows:
(1) SW, - SW, = W2BE EC= W2BE2 C + CE2E,
(2) SW, - SW, = CE2EI.
This formulation establishes that SW, - SW 2 > SW2 - SW3 . Therefore, net social
welfare at the time of passage of Title VII (SW,) is necessarily closer to net social
welfare in the discriminatory state with no legislation (SW2) than SW 2 is to SW,.
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namic efficiency of Title VII. For simplicity, assume that the time
paths of social welfare are linear as shown in figure 3. Assume also
that the burdens of Title VII cause discriminatory firms to be driven
from the market twice as fast as in the laissez-faire state-social wel-
fare rises to the nondiscriminatory level (SW 1) after two periods with-
out Title VII and after one period with it. Because total welfare will be
the same after two periods, the effect of Title VII can be evaluated by
comparing total social welfare for the first two time periods.
Total social welfare in the laissez-faire state (SWLF) and in a Ti-
tle VII world (SWv1 1 ) will be given by the area below the respective
time paths of social welfare in figure 3:
SWLF = 2SW2 + (2) (SW - SW.) = SW, + SW 2
SWvlI = 2SW 3 + 2(SW - SW 3 ) + (SW , - SWa)
= 3/2SW 1 + SW,.4S
The imposition of Title VII will enhance social welfare, then, if:
SWvII - SWLF > O;
3/2SW1 + SWS - SWx - SW 2 > 0; or
SW 1 - SW 2 > SW' - SW 3.
Put differently, Title VII will enhance social welfare if the initial
reduction in welfare caused by the statute (SW 2 - SWs) is smaller
than the initial welfare loss associated with the existence of discrimina-
tion (SW 1 - SW,). Under the assumptions of this example, this condi-
tion necessarily will hold, and the imposition of Title VII will increase
total social welfare.
44
CONCLUSION
This essay demonstrates that the theoretical attack on the effi-
ciency of Title VII is seriously incomplete. Without altering any of the
assumptions of the neoclassical model, I have attempted to show that it
48 These figures can be obtained by computing the areas of the respective rectan-
gles and triangles below the two time paths from time 0 to 2 in figure 3. To simplify
the computation, a zero discount rate is assumed; in other words, it is postulated that a
dollar earned today is equivalent to a dollar earned in the future. Introducing a positive
discount rate (r) can be accomplished by resort to integral calculus:
SWLF = I' (SW 2 + t(SW, - SW2)/2)e'rtdt
SWVII =10' [SW, + t(SW - SW)]e-rtdt +I2 SWxe'rtdt.
With a sufficiently high discount rate, the future benefits that are generated by
Title VII would be outweighed by the early losses it imposes.
" This condition is proved supra note 43.
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is impossible to claim, as an a priori matter, that Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act reduces social welfare. It is entirely plausible, al-
though ultimately an empirical question, that Title VII can be under-
stood to represent wealth-maximizing legislation rather than as some
tyrannical or misguided attempt to disregard private preferences. In-
deed, antidiscrimination legislation may be thought of as a tool to per-
fect the market response to employer discrimination.
The basic argument is that, although Title VII clearly lowers
short-run social welfare it also can be wealth-maximizing in the long
run. Using the analogy of the turnpike theorem from optimal growth
theory,45 Title VII may take us out of our way at first, but once we get
on the turnpike, it gets us where we want to go in less time.
Some may argue that the neoclassical approach is so impoverished
that they would rather forgo this defense of Title VII. They may con-
tend that Becker's model cannot be applied usefully to labor markets or
employer discrimination, or that wealth maximization is not an appro-
priate normative goal, and thereby simply reject this entire analysis.
Others, while retaining the principle of wealth maximization, might
argue that the discriminatory costs represented by the shifted-up supply
curve S, simply are not legitimate and therefore should not be consid-
ered as true social costs. In this case, the appropriate wealth-maximiz-
ing outcome once again becomes E1 rather than E,, thereby legitimiz-
ing Title VII's mandate. Although this argument has strong moral
appeal to the opponents of racial discrimination, it necessarily invites
the criticism that the decision to disregard the preferences of discrimi-
natory employers constitutes an unprincipled lapse into subjectivism.
I have not argued that the Becker model is the only way, or even
the best way, to analyze employment discrimination. But as long as this
model is being used as a weapon to attack the Civil Rights Act, I be-
lieve it is important to show that a correct application of this model can
buttress-rather than undermine-the case for Title VII. Moreover, to
the extent one prefers to see the costs of discrimination borne by the
discriminators, rather than the victims (who are undoubtedly less afflu-
ent), the normative appeal of the civil rights legislation is enhanced
commensurately.
45 See, e.g., McKenzie, Turnpike Theorems for a Generalized Leontief Model, 31
ECONOMETRICA 165 (1963); Norishima, Proof of a Turnpike Theorem, The No Joint
Production Case, 28 REv. ECON. STUD. 89 (1961); Phelps, The Golden Rule of Ac-
cumulation: A Fable for Growthmen, 51 AM. ECON. REv. 638 (1961).
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